Last week, I questioned how seriously we should take the initial direction of Mr. Trump’s attempt to end the war in Ukraine—an approach that involves openly conceding to Russia’s demand for territorial annexation and a binding commitment to block Ukraine from NATO membership. This was followed by a bizarre attack on Zelensky on X, where the U.S. president accused his Ukrainian counterpart of being a dictator and of instigating the war. On Friday, scenes at the White House made it abundantly clear: we should take it very seriously indeed. On first glance, Noah Smith and Niall Ferguson were right, and I was wrong. The fates of the key players in this drama are deeply intertwined and will converge soon enough, but it’s worth examining them separately.
Read MoreNoah Smith, an American columnist and Substacker, and historian Niall Ferguson both made the mistake last week of attempting to rationalise the Trump administration’s fumbling attempts to get Ukrainian peace talks underway.
Niall Ferguson appears to be making a completely reasonable point—one echoed by numerous other observers last week—that it was a mistake for the U.S. to publicly acknowledge that Ukraine can never become a full member of NATO and that the country must cede territory to Russia as part of any peace deal, even if both positions are widely accepted on the Western and Ukrainian sides of the negotiations. This, of course, was before Mr. Trump went on one of his ill-advised social media rampages, effectively accusing Ukraine of starting the war and labeling its sitting president a dictator.
Read MoreI have just returned from two weeks of holiday, and I have a lot on my mind. First things first, on the war between Israel and Hamas; emotions are running high and as a result, the quality of initial opinion and analysis is clouded and governed by hard-held priors. That always make for a treacherous information environment, especially in a situation as complex as is the conflict between Israel and its border states, not to mention the political situation in the Middle East as a whole. I am making the following initial assumptions. As long as it is Israel and Hamas pounding each other to a pulp—with devastating consequences mainly in Gaza as the IDF brings the heat—markets will eventually stop caring. The obvious risk is that a bloody conflict between Hamas and Israel spills over into wider military conflict in the Middle East. It is grim irony that Iran recently warned how a heavy-handed response by Israel “could spiral out of control and ricochet into far-reaching consequences”. Teheran is right, and I suspect that it is exactly what it, Hamas, other key actors in the Middle East, not to mention Russia, want.
Read MoreIn my day-job I am forced to write my economic outlook for the new year in December, alongside most other economists. This is part of a long-standing sell-side tradition, and at Christmas time, you don’t change traditions. The real way to do it, however, is to way a few weeks into January to see where the dust settles and how investors vote with their money in the early sessions of the year. I thus present the Alpha Sources version; five key questions for 2023, and as many answers. I’ll start with the war in Russia, asking what in fact Russia will achieve, if anything. I then ask whether 60/40 portfolio will rebound in 2023, and whether the leadership in global equities is changing. I then qualify my answer with a question on geopolitics and the free flow of goods and capital between China and the US, before asking whether Covid is over.
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