The idea of government intervention and demand-side fiscal stimulus was born by Keynes, eradicated by neoclassical economics, lazily reintroduced by the new Keynesians, and is now enjoying a renaissance. It’s fiendishly difficult to judge history in real time, but I would bet that the current shift has momentum, a position that has been strengthened by the response to the Covid-19 crisis. It is perhaps unfair to insist on a marriage between this story and MMT, but it serves as an introduction to the issues at hand. The idea that governments with sovereign Chartalist currencies can’t run out of money, and that this power should be used to achieve full employment, is enticing. It is also, however, naive. MMT easily dodges the main theoretical critique, at least in the current environment. The Phillips Curve probably still exists, but it has also flattened significantly, making it difficult to attack MMT armed with the traditional trade-off between unemployment and inflation. If MMT passes this first test, however, it fails the subsequent trials. The implementation of MMT in today’s economy requires significant shifts in the relationship between fiscal and monetary policymakers and an end to the free flow of capital. My sense is that about half the proponents of the theory don’t have a clue about any of this. The other half understands that MMT requires an end to central bank independence, and a significant reduction in capital mobility. The problem is that this latter group aren’t being honest, and for that reason, I am skeptical about their true motivation. If you want to dial back globalization, the least you can do is to be honest about what this means for households and firms. If you think that an independent central bank is a suboptimal institution, how will the alternative look, and how will it be held accountable?
Read MoreDo you remember what you were taught in introductory economics? Do you remember how much math you had to chew through in graduate school? Do you want to relive that? Alternatively, you might just have wondered why macroeconomists write and speak like they do, why they use complex math to explain seemingly simple concepts, and why they don't seem to agree on anything?
In this first part, I pick apart the traditional undergraduate story of macroeconomics, and try to explain why Keynes and Friedman maybe weren't as different as everyone would like you to believe. In doing so, I am setting up the big plunge into why on earth macroeconomics has come to rely on a fusion of math and representative agent models to make theories of the world, a story that I will grapple with in part 2 of this show.
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