The chancellor of the Exchequer had sobering news for the UK public last month when he unveiled that the Treasury is on track to borrow almost 20% of GDP this year to plug the hole in the economy created by the virus, a move that will see the public debt-to-GDP ratio zoom past 100%. In a world governed by the rules of the now-defunct work by Rogoff and Reinhart—famously discredited by a spreadsheet error—these numbers would send chills down the spine of economists and public policymakers, but we’ve moved from on then, significantly. We now understand that the government does not operate under a budget constraint, and that it can, in fact, create as much (sovereign) money it wants to buy as much debt that it wishes to issue—via primary market purchases by the central bank—to finance whatever level of spending and investment—ostensibly to generate jobs for every able man and woman—that it wants. I treated these issues in a long-form essay on fiscal policy, but the elevator pitch is simple enough. Under the auspice of MMT, governments have the ability and duty to create jobs for everyone and to prevent financial and economic distress and harm. It must do so because the economic costs and constraints hitherto associated with such a policy strategy are figments of Neo-Classical economists’ imagination.
Read MoreI this video I discuss patriotism and nationalism in Europe and in the U.K., using the Brexit referendum as a case study. I open the video by reading an excerpt from a recent article in the Point magazine, in which editor Jon Baskin interviews Princeton professor George Kateb about his writings, ideas and thoughts on patriotism. The views expressed here are mine and mine alone, and as I say in the introduction, I am using Mr. Kateb’s arguments out of context, which is to say, I am using the very specific points he makes to Baskin as an amouche bouche for my discussion. I am not familiar with Mr. Kateb’s writings at large. Though I don’t mention him directly, I have also been inspired by recent comments by Douglas Murray, and conversations between him and other interviewers, relating to the oddness of being ashamed of one's history and heritage. I apologise for the cover of my notebook protruding annoyingly in the bottom of the frame.
Thanks, as always, for watching.
Read MoreThe idea of government intervention and demand-side fiscal stimulus was born by Keynes, eradicated by neoclassical economics, lazily reintroduced by the new Keynesians, and is now enjoying a renaissance. It’s fiendishly difficult to judge history in real time, but I would bet that the current shift has momentum, a position that has been strengthened by the response to the Covid-19 crisis. It is perhaps unfair to insist on a marriage between this story and MMT, but it serves as an introduction to the issues at hand. The idea that governments with sovereign Chartalist currencies can’t run out of money, and that this power should be used to achieve full employment, is enticing. It is also, however, naive. MMT easily dodges the main theoretical critique, at least in the current environment. The Phillips Curve probably still exists, but it has also flattened significantly, making it difficult to attack MMT armed with the traditional trade-off between unemployment and inflation. If MMT passes this first test, however, it fails the subsequent trials. The implementation of MMT in today’s economy requires significant shifts in the relationship between fiscal and monetary policymakers and an end to the free flow of capital. My sense is that about half the proponents of the theory don’t have a clue about any of this. The other half understands that MMT requires an end to central bank independence, and a significant reduction in capital mobility. The problem is that this latter group aren’t being honest, and for that reason, I am skeptical about their true motivation. If you want to dial back globalization, the least you can do is to be honest about what this means for households and firms. If you think that an independent central bank is a suboptimal institution, how will the alternative look, and how will it be held accountable?
Read MoreIt has been clear for a while that Covid-19 would be a big shock to the global economy, but early predictions of a quick rebound, and a return to normal, now look fanciful. I am now inclined to believe that just about everything will change. My old colleague, and good friend, Jonathan Tepper is musing on a similar note in a recent piece on Unherd.com. I recommend that you go read it; it’s a great piece. For my part, I’ll split my arguments into two observations, not necessarily market-related, but both are key to understand the evolution of markets and the economy in the next few quarters, and I would suggest, beyond as well. We are not even through the first quarter yet, but it’s fair to say that the first chart on my next page already is the chart of the year. It portrays the “optimal” strategy to combat the virus relative to doing nothing, and a policy of loose mitigation. Leaving the Chinese and South Korean outbreaks aside—as well as the grim disaster unfolding in Iran—I think it’s fair to make two overall points. Firstly, there has been a significant debate about the correct strategy to combat the virus. The responses have been scattered on a spectrum ranging from (unconfirmed?) pictures of Chinese authorities welding doors shut to apartment blocks to halt the spread, over to “herd immunity”. Or, as former SAS soldier Ant Middleton’s suggests; “fuck Covid-19”, a statement that he, in fairness, has now retracted.
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